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98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020) 
Tully v. City of Wilmington: A Fundamental Right To Be Treated 
Reasonably at Work* 
Kevin Tully, a distinguished police corporal in Wilmington, North Carolina, 
was rejected for a promotion because he outsmarted his advancement test—the 
“correct” answers were based on outdated law, while Tully’s answers were up-
to-date. When Tully was denied an internal appeal of his test results, he turned 
to the North Carolina Constitution for help. For the first time, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina interpreted article I, section 1 of the state constitution, 
which guarantees to every North Carolinian the “enjoyment of the fruits of their 
own labor,” to protect a fundamental right to pursue one’s chosen occupation in 
the public sector as well as the private sector. Across America, public employees 
suffer from stagnant wages, growing workloads, and political gamesmanship. 
They are largely denied rights guaranteed to private employees by federal 
employment and labor statutes and to other citizens by the federal Constitution. 
This Recent Development shows how state courts can “step into the breach” by 
extending similar state constitutional provisions to public employees. 
This Recent Development makes three contributions. First, it defines the 
contours of this often overlooked fundamental right protected by article I, section 
1 by tracing the “fruits clause” from its adoption in 1868 to today, drawing a 
single thread of reasoning from the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s 
antiregulatory precedent to its most recent case, Tully v. City of Wilmington. 
Second, it synthesizes precedential treatment of the fruits clause, outlining a 
straightforward test for judges to evaluate future claims brought by public 
employees under the clause. Third, it uses two examples—overworked school 
social workers and counselors and nonconfidential sexual harassment reporting 
policies for state legislative employees—to demonstrate how creative lawyers can 
improve working conditions for public employees by litigating future cases under 
the fruits clause. 
In his now famous article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, former United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan called on 
civil rights advocates to look beyond the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to state constitutions, which, too, are “font[s] of individual liberties.”1 Brennan 
 
 *  © 2020 James W. Whalen. 
 1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
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criticized that, eight years after the Warren Court,2 the U.S. Supreme Court 
had “crippled” the protections of the federal Constitution, condoning “both 
isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties” throughout the country.3 In 
such circumstances, he argued, the task of protecting civil rights falls to the 
arbiters of state constitutional protections.4 
Justice Brennan’s depiction of crippled federal rights rings particularly 
true for government employees. Over Brennan’s protests, the federal 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process has not been meaningfully extended to 
public employees,5 and citizens may lose other fundamental rights simply by 
being on the government’s payroll.6 
Luckily, the Supreme Court of North Carolina “step[ped] into the 
breach”7 in Tully v. City of Wilmington,8 transforming an often-overlooked clause 
of the North Carolina Constitution into a powerful protector of public 
employee rights. Article I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, which 
recognizes an “inalienable right[]” to the “enjoyment of the fruits of their own 
labor,”9 had primarily been interpreted as a limit on the state’s economic 
 
 2. Chief Justice Earl Warren retired in 1969. The Warren Court, 1953–1969, SUP. CT. HIST. 
SOC’Y, https://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_court_warren.html [https://perma.cc/FB7S-
6FWA]. 
 3. Brennan, supra note 1, at 502–03 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (denying 
federal habeas corpus relief for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search violation when state courts 
have considered the Fourth Amendment claim)). See generally Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 
(1976) (denying federal habeas corpus relief for alleged exclusion of African Americans from a grand 
jury when the defendant failed to raise the issue in state court); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) 
(holding law enforcement may publicly condemn individuals as criminals without due process); Rizzo 
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (denying federal equitable relief to plaintiffs injured by law enforcement 
when named defendants “played no affirmative part in depriving . . . any constitutional rights”); Hicks 
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (holding that federal plaintiffs cannot challenge the constitutionality 
of a criminal statute when no state criminal proceedings are yet pending against plaintiffs); O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (finding no case or controversy when the plaintiffs had not personally 
suffered the constitutional violations alleged). 
 4. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503. 
 5. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997) (finding no Due Process Clause violation 
when a police officer was suspended without pay after being charged, but not convicted, of a crime); 
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972) (finding no Due Process Clause 
violation when a state university declined to rehire a professor without a hearing); Cafeteria & Rest. 
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 887, 899 (1961) (finding no Due Process Clause 
violation when a short-order cook at a naval gun factory was fired without reason or a hearing). But see 
McElroy, 367 U.S. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[This case’s] result in effect nullifies the 
substantive right . . . not to be arbitrarily injured by Government.”). 
 6. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) 
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect federal employees’ right to participate in campaign 
management). But see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A] teacher’s exercise of 
his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public 
employment.”). 
 7. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503. 
 8. 370 N.C. 527, 810 S.E.2d 208 (2018). 
 9. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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regulatory power in past cases.10 However, in Tully, the court expanded its 
interpretation to include a limit on government treatment of its own employees, 
guaranteeing every public employee the fundamental right to “pursue his 
chosen profession free from” unreasonable government interference.11 
Though the holding in Tully was limited to the facts in that case, this 
Recent Development argues that the court’s reasoning recognizes a broad, 
fundamental right for public employees to be treated reasonably by their 
employers. Consequently, mistreated public employees who, except in rare 
circumstances,12 would have no recourse under the federal Constitution may 
now seek relief under North Carolina law. Across the country, millions of public 
employees are harassed, overworked, denied benefits, or terminated due to 
unreasonable government actions or policies.13 Rooted in an enumerated right 
unique to the North Carolina Constitution but with sisters and brothers 
throughout the United States,14 Tully’s reasoning provides a roadmap for how 
creative lawyers can win relief for public employees in state court. 
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly 
summarizes the history of article I, section 1 and outlines the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina’s decision in Tully. Section II.A defines the fundamental 
right to “pursue [one’s] chosen profession,”15 evoked in Tully, by analyzing how 
it has been understood and protected in the state’s antiregulatory precedent. 
Section II.B instructs courts how to identify and remedy when public employers 
violate this fundamental right. Finally, Part III outlines two specific examples 
of how this newly understood right can protect school counselors from being 
overworked and government employees from sexual harassment. 
I.  TULLY V. CITY OF WILMINGTON 
A. History of the “Fruits Clause” 
Unlike the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Constitution begins 
with its Declaration of Rights.16 Exceptionally concerned with government 
 
 10. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 11. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215. 
 12. See, e.g., Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the Constitution prohibits a public employer from revoking an occupational license and 
disseminating negative information about an employee without due process). 
 13. See Mike Maciag, The Alarming Consequences of Police Working Overtime, GOVERNING: 
FUTURE STS. & LOCALITIES (Oct. 2017), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-
safety/gov-police-officers-overworked-cops.html [https://perma.cc/UG78-XHDY]; Katie Reilly, ‘I 
Work 3 Jobs and Donate Blood Plasma To Pay the Bills.’ This Is What It’s Like To Be a Teacher in America, 
TIME (Sept. 13, 2018), https://time.com/longform/teaching-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/A5JB-
4C3F]. 
 14. See infra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
 15. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215. 
 16. N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–38. 
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encroachment on individual liberties, North Carolina’s framers adopted the 
declaration one day before adopting the state constitution itself17 and refused to 
ratify the U.S. Constitution until the Bill of Rights was passed.18 Given the 
primacy of individual liberty in the minds of the framers, North Carolina courts 
have long recognized a “‘direct action under the State Constitution against state 
officials for violation of rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights’ when 
no other state law remedy is available.”19 
In 1868, North Carolina amended the beginning of its Declaration of 
Rights to state that “all persons are . . . endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits 
of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness.”20 North Carolina adopted the 
“fruits of their own labor” clause (“fruits clause”) in the same year the nation 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.21 The fruits 
clause was adopted during Reconstruction and was “obviously grounded in the 
history of an enslaved people obligated to work for the benefit of others but 
unable to benefit for themselves.”22 
Despite the abolitionist origins of the fruits clause, North Carolina courts 
have largely interpreted it as a libertarian limit on government economic 
regulation, protecting “legitimate business, occupation, or trade” from 
regulation that was not “reasonably necessary” for “the promotion or protection 
of the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare.”23 Under 
the fruits clause, North Carolina courts have struck down regulations of private 
businesses including photography,24 real estate advertising,25 companion escort 
services,26 and tow trucks.27 
In 1979, the Supreme Court of North Carolina expanded the fruits clause 
to protect public employees in addition to private businesses.28 In Presnell v. 
 
 17. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289–90 (1992). 
 18. Troy L. Kickler, North Carolina’s Ratification Debates Guaranteed Bill of Rights, N.C. HIST. 
PROJECT, https://northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/north-carolinas-ratification-debates-
guaranteed-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/SP77-VQ9J]. 
 19. Tully, 370 N.C. at 533, 810 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 
290). 
 20. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 22. Mitch Kokai, Protecting the Fruits of College Athletes’ Labor, CAROLINA J. (Jan. 24, 2019, 4:02 
AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/opinion-article/protecting-the-fruits-of-college-athletes-labor/ 
[https://perma.cc/P38Q-CUPV] (quoting former Supreme Court of North Carolina Justice Bob Orr). 
 23. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949). 
 24. Id. 
 25. N.C. Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 10, 13, 228 S.E.2d 493, 495–96 
(1976). 
 26. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County., 83 N.C. App. 345, 353, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986). 
 27. King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 408, 758 S.E.2d 364, 371 (2014). 
 28. Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 717–18, 260 S.E.2d 611, 612–13 (1979). 
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Pell,29 a public school principal fired an employee based on a false claim that the 
employee had distributed liquor on school grounds.30 Despite her employer’s 
dishonesty, the employee had no recourse under state tort law because North 
Carolina allows even bad faith terminations of at-will employees.31 Still, the 
court allowed the employee’s claims for defamation and wrongful termination 
to proceed—while the termination itself may not have risen to a violation, the 
principal’s false accusations could have unreasonably inhibited the employee’s 
ability to find future employment in the private sector.32 Though a strong first 
step, the holding in Presnell was restrictive. Under Presnell, government 
mistreatment of public employees was only violative if it interfered with future, 
private employment opportunities. Prior to deciding Tully in 2018, the court 
had never recognized a fundamental right to pursue work in the public sector 
free from unreasonable government interference.33 
B. Factual Summary and Procedural History 
Kevin Tully—a police corporal for the Wilmington Police Department—
applied for a promotion after eleven distinguished years of service.34 During his 
tenure, Tully investigated over fifty homicides, led twelve homicide 
investigations with a 100% clearance rate, and was named the 2011 “Wilmington 
Police Officer of the Year.”35 
Tully completed a written examination as part of his application but 
failed.36 Confused, Tully obtained a copy of the official exam and discovered he 
had outsmarted the test: the “correct” answers were based on outdated law.37 
Tully filed a grievance informing the city of its error but was told that “the test 
answers were not a grievable item.”38 This response directly conflicted with the 
department’s policy manual, which stated that “[c]andidates may appeal any 
portion of the selection process.”39 
Tully filed suit on December 30, 2014, alleging state constitutional 
violations.40 Tully’s claim alleged that the city’s denial of his promotion 
 
 29. 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979). 
 30. Id. at 717–18, 260 S.E.2d at 613. 
 31. Id. at 718–19, 260 S.E.2d at 613. 
 32. Id. at 719, 260 S.E.2d at 614. 
 33. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 533, 810 S.E.2d 208, 213 (2018) (“[A]pplication 
of this constitutional provision in the present context is an issue of first impression.”). 
 34. Id. at 528, 810 S.E.2d at 210–211. 
 35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Id. at 528, 810 S.E.2d at 211. 
 37. Id. at 529, 810 S.E.2d at 211. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 530, 810 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting CITY OF WILMINGTON POLICE DEP’T, POLICY 
MANUAL directive 4.11, ¶ III(f), at 6 (rev. ed. July 25, 2011)). 
 40. Id. at 530, 810 S.E.2d at 211–12. Tully pleaded violations of both article I, section 1 and article 
I, section 19. Section 19 prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property “but by the law of the land,” 
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“arbitrarily and irrationally deprived [him] of enjoyment of the fruits of his own 
labor” in violation of article I, section 1.41 The trial court dismissed Tully’s 
claims.42 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Tully 
was entitled to a “‘non-arbitrary and non-capricious promotional process’ in 
accordance with the rules set forth in the Policy Manual, including its appeals 
provision.”43 
C. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed, finding that, as pleaded by 
Tully, the state acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying him the right to 
appeal a portion of his promotion application when its policies allowed him to 
“appeal any portion of the selection process” in violation of his constitutional 
rights.44 The test answers were in fact a “grievable item.” Consequently, Tully 
had been denied his “right under Article I, Section 1 to pursue his chosen 
profession free from actions by his governmental employer that, by their very 
nature, are unreasonable because they contravene policies specifically 
promulgated by that employer for the purpose of having a fair promotional 
process.”45 
The Tully court rooted its holding in four doctrinal conclusions. First, the 
court noted that the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights must be 
interpreted “liberal[ly] . . . in favor of [North Carolina] citizens.”46 Reflecting 
on the history of article I, section 1,47 the court concluded that “[t]he very 
purpose of the Declaration of Rights is to ensure that the violation of these 
rights is never permitted by anyone who might be invested under the 
Constitution with the powers of the State.”48 
Second, the court reaffirmed that the fruits clause constitutes a 
“fundamental guarant[y]”49 that “emphasizes the dignity, integrity and liberty 
 
a phrase “synonymous with due process.” Id. at 538–39, 810 S.E.2d at 216–17 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (first quoting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; and then quoting State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 
769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).  
 41. Id. at 530, 810 S.E.2d at 212. 
 42. Id. at 531, 810 S.E.2d at 212. 
 43. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tully v. City of Wilmington, 249 N.C. App. 204, 210, 790 
S.E.2d 854, 858 (2016)). 
 44. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 45. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215–16. 
 46. Id. at 533, 810 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 
276, 290 (1992)). 
 47. See supra Section I.A. 
 48. Tully, 370 N.C. at 533, 810 S.E.2d at 213–14 (quoting Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 
783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992)). 
 49. Id. at 534, 810 S.E.2d at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ballance, 
229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).  
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of the individual, the primary concern of our democracy.”50 Drawing a line from 
its antiregulatory precedent to the current case, the court repeated that the 
clause is “very broad in scope” and is “intended to secure . . . extensive 
individual rights.”51 
Third, the Tully court explicitly held that the fruits clause applies both 
when the government acts as a regulator and when “a governmental entity acts 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner toward one of its employees.”52 Echoing 
Presnell, the court held that, although Tully lacked a property interest in a 
promotion, he had a “liberty interest in pursuing [his] chosen profession free 
from unreasonable actions of [his] employer.”53 
Finally, the court held that a public employer’s action is “arbitrary and 
capricious” when it “fail[s] to abide by promotional procedures that the 
employer itself put in place.”54 For this conclusion, the court looked to federal 
caselaw from other contexts—immigration and tax law—which has held that 
agency action in violation of “rules, regulations, or procedures which it has 
established” will be struck down.55 
Relying on these four conclusions, the court found that Tully had properly 
stated a claim for relief.56 Noting “the admittedly sparse authority in this area 
of the law,” the Tully court elected not to proffer a broad constitutional cause of 
action but instead limited its holding to the facts of the immediate case.57 In 
order to state a claim “grounded in this unique right under the North Carolina 
Constitution,”58 the court held: 
a public employee must show that no other state law remedy is available 
and plead facts establishing three elements: (1) a clear, established rule 
or policy existed regarding the employment promotional process that 
furthered a legitimate governmental interest; (2) the employer violated 
that policy; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result of that violation.59 
 
 50. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 693, 114 
S.E.2d 660, 663 (1960)). 
 51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).  
 52. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 215. 
 53. Id. at 534, 810 S.E.2d at 214. 
 54. Id. at 535–36, 810 S.E.2d at 215. 
 55. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811–12 (4th Cir. 1969) (citing United States ex rel. 
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, (1954)); see also Farlow v. N.C. State Bd. of Chiropractic 
Exam’rs, 76 N.C. App. 202, 208, 332 S.E.2d 696, 700 (1985) (observing that Accardi’s “rationale is 
sound”). 
 56. Tully, 370 N.C. at 537–38, 810 S.E.2d at 216. 
 57. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 216. 
 58. Id. at 536–37, 810 S.E.2d at 216. 
 59. Id. 
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II.  A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE TREATED REASONABLY AT WORK 
While the holding in Tully only addresses situations where a public 
employer violates its own published policy, the court’s reasoning is considerably 
broader. Rather than articulate a specific right for public employees, the court 
applied the broad right developed in its previous fruits clause cases to the public 
employer-employee relationship. This part endeavors to outline the contours of 
this fundamental right to articulate why courts ought to apply heightened 
scrutiny to public employer actions. 
A. The Fruits Clause Establishes a “Fundamental Right,” and Infringement 
Receives Heightened Scrutiny 
Article I, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees a 
“fundamental right to ‘earn a livelihood’”60 and “pursue [one’s] chosen 
profession.”61 To understand this right, North Carolina courts look to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence as guidance.62 Still, the 
North Carolina Constitution is “more detailed and specific than the federal 
Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens.”63 A regulation may 
receive more exacting scrutiny under the North Carolina Constitution than it 
would under federal law.64 Thus, a government action that abridges the right to 
pursue one’s chosen occupation will be held invalid unless it meets a “single 
standard”: it must have a “rational, real and substantial relation to a valid 
governmental objective.”65 While this test sounds like “rational basis” review, 
North Carolina precedent strongly suggests that it bites like heightened 
 
 60. King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 408, 758 S.E.2d 364, 371 (2014) (quoting Roller 
v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 518–19, 96 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1957)). 
 61. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215. 
 62. See, e.g., Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 724, 260 S.E.2d 611, 617 (1979) (first citing Codd v. 
Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); and then citing Cox v. N. Va. Transp. Comm’n, 551 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 
1976)). Interestingly, the Presnell court cited to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and to Truax 
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), for the proposition that a fundamental right “to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life” was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as well as by article I, 
section 1. Presnell, 298 N.C. at 724, 260 S.E.2d at 617 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399). However, the 
Presnell court seemingly ignored the Supreme Court’s decision to abandon its economic fundamental 
rights jurisprudence in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). Still, the Tully court 
referenced Presnell as a justification for the existence of a similar right under article I, section 1 of the 
North Carolina Constitution. Tully, 370 N.C. at 534–35, 810 S.E.2d at 214–15. Thus, it is appropriate 
to consider Presnell instructive in our effort to understand the implications of the fruits clause on public 
employees, even if Presnell’s treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer doctrinally sound.  
 63. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992). 
 64. See Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 351–52, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369 
(1986) (“[O]ur state Supreme Court has reserved the right to grant relief against unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or capricious legislation under our state constitution in circumstances under which no relief 
might be granted by federal court interpretations of due process.”). 
 65. Id. at 352, 350 S.E.2d at 369–70. 
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scrutiny. A thorough analysis of this “single standard” is necessary to 
understand how the fruits clause can be used to better protect public employees. 
1.  Ballance and the Development of the Single Heightened-Scrutiny Standard 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina first articulated its modern “single 
standard” test to measure violations of the fruits clause in State v. Ballance.66 
Decided in 1949, Ballance was adjudicated before the U.S. Supreme Court fully 
developed modern scrutiny tests.67 Still, the Ballance court had the benefit of 
two U.S. Supreme Court cases outlining levels of scrutiny: United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.68 and Korematsu v. United States69. Under Carolene 
Products’s rational basis review, a law survives so long as it is rationally related 
to some legitimate government objective, and courts give extreme deference to 
the government, presuming “the existence of facts supporting the legislative 
judgment,” even in the absence of such facts.70 In contrast, under the “rigid 
scrutiny”71 described in Korematsu, a court gives no deference to the government 
and allows government action only after agreeing the action was “necessary” to 
achieve a compelling government interest.72 
In Ballance, the state prohibited professional photographers from taking 
pictures without a state license.73 In support of the law, the government argued 
that the licensing scheme reduced the risk of fire from photography chemicals 
and protected the public from unskilled or fraudulent photographers.74 Still, the 
court struck down the licensing requirement as a violation of the fruits clause.75 
The Ballance court held that the law lacked a “rational, real, or substantial 
relation to the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare” 
and was not “reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a public 
good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.”76 Despite the state’s 
 
 66. 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949). 
 67. Id.; cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (establishing the doctrine of strict scrutiny); 
Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict 
Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 29 (2005) (“It was in the Bolling case that the Court clearly 
and definitively established its doctrine of ‘strict scrutiny.’”).  
 68. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 69. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). Korematsu 
is widely regarded as a lousy example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of heightened scrutiny. 
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme 
Court Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for African 
Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165, 167 (1996). Given that this case was the only example of 
heightened scrutiny available to the Ballance court in 1949, though, it is worth outlining here.  
 70. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. 
 71. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
 72. Id. at 217–18. 
 73. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 766, 51 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1949). 
 74. Id. at 770–71, 51 S.E.2d at 735–36. 
 75. Id. at 772, 51 S.E.2d at 736. 
 76. Id. at 769–70, 51 S.E.2d at 735. 
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contention that a regulation of photographers would reduce fire and fraud, the 
court found that the fire risk posed by photographers’ chemicals was “no greater 
than that inseparable from the things utilized daily in the home and in scores of 
other vocations,”77 and the risk of unskilled photography was “no more 
dangerous to the public than any other ordinary occupation of life.”78 Further, 
the court reasoned that “ordinarily the public is best served by the free 
competition of free men in a free market.”79 Unskilled, fraudulent photography 
could be better prevented, the court argued, through competition than 
regulation. Finally, because the law attempted to regulate “one of the many 
usual legitimate and innocuous vocations by which men earn their daily 
bread,”80 it violated the photographer’s fundamental right to “earn his 
livelihood by any lawful calling.”81 
Ballance stands for three powerful principles that North Carolina courts 
still use when applying heightened scrutiny to determine whether a government 
action violates the fruits clause. First, the deference typical of Carolene Products’s 
rational basis review is not afforded to the government under the “single 
standard.” The Ballance court did not presume the existence of facts supporting 
the legislature’s assertion that its regulation would reduce fire and fraud and 
rejected those proffered interests.82 Second, the government’s proffered “valid” 
interest must be directly connected to the occupation regulated. Government 
regulation of photography was inappropriate in Ballance, in part, because 
photography was a “usual legitimate and innocuous vocation[].”83 Third, 
government action is not “reasonably related” when its proffered interest can 
be achieved through less restrictive, alternative means. The Ballance court 
rejected the regulation, in part, because fire and fraud could be more effectively 
reduced in the open market without infringing on anyone’s constitutional 
rights. These principles, applied here to regulation of a private occupation, 
clearly constitute a more heightened scrutiny than traditional rational basis 
review and can guide modern courts in evaluating government action toward 
public employees. 
 
 77. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 735. 
 78. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rawles v. Jenkins, 
279 S.W. 350, 352 (Ky. 1925)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 770, 51 S.E.2d 735. 
 81. Id. at 769, 51 S.E.2d 734. 
 82. Id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d 735–36. Compare this reasoning in Ballance to the “great deference” given 
to policymakers under the “rational basis test” implemented in Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 
167, 180–81, 594 S.E.2d 1, 7, 15 (2004). 
 83. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 770–71, 51 S.E.2d at 735. 
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2.  Valid Government Interests and the Regulation of “Ordinary and Simple” 
Occupations 
Since Ballance, North Carolina courts have honed the meaning of “valid 
governmental objective.”84 To begin, a valid objective must “promote the 
accomplishment of a public good” or “prevent the infliction of a public harm.”85 
Still, not every occupation is sufficiently connected to the public good to fall 
within the scope of the so-called “police power.”86 Thus, the government has no 
valid reason to regulate those “ordinary lawful and innocuous occupations” at 
the core of the fruits clause.87 
An occupation is “ordinary and simple”88 so long as it does not have some 
“distinguishing feature in the business itself or in the manner in which it is 
ordinarily conducted, the . . . probable consequence of which, if unregulated, is 
to produce substantial injury to the public peace, health, or welfare.”89 In other 
words, an occupation is beyond the reach of government regulation unless it can 
be distinguished in a way that implicates the public welfare. Regulations of 
these ordinary and simple occupations fail heightened scrutiny; because they 
have insufficient connection to any public good, regulation of these occupations 
lacks any legally sufficient “valid objective.”90 Consequently, courts have “not 
hesitated to strike down regulatory legislation” that touches on such occupations 
“as repugnant to the State Constitution.”91 
The line between complex and simple occupations is a fine one. In North 
Carolina Real Estate Licensing Board v. Aikens,92 the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals drew that line between real estate brokers and real estate advertisers. 
Sixteen years earlier, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Warren93 
upheld a law regulating real estate brokers because real estate transactions 
“provide opportunities for collusion to extract illicit gains” and are of serious 
 
 84. See Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64, 366 S.E.2d 697, 698–99 (1988); Treants 
Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986). 
 85. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 769–70, 51 S.E.2d at 735. 
 86. Id. at 769, 51 S.E.2d at 734 (“[T]he State possesses the police power in its capacity as a 
sovereign, and in the exercise thereof, the Legislature may enact laws, within constitutional limits, to 
protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society.”). 
 87. Id. at 770, 51 S.E.2d at 735. 
 88. N.C. Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 13, 228 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1976).  
 89. Stone, 322 N.C. at 65, 366 S.E.2d at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State 
v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 758–59, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940)). 
 90. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. at 11, 228 S.E.2d at 495. 
 91. Id. at 11, 228 S.E.2d at 495 (first citing Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957); 
then citing Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731; then citing Palmer v. Smith, 229 N.C. 612, 51 S.E.2d 
8 (1948); and then citing Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940)). 
 92. 31 N.C. App. 8, 228 S.E.2d 493 (1976). 
 93. 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).  
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“economic significance,” meaning the “mismanagement of either could produce 
widespread distress and unrest.”94 
After Warren, the North Carolina General Assembly expanded the law to 
cover those who advertise property available for sale, lease, or rent, without 
actually facilitating any transactions.95 The Aikens court distinguished these 
advertisers from the brokers in Warren, since “[t]he business activity . . . does 
not involve a confidential relationship with the customers nor negotiations or 
other acts as an intermediary,” and none of the “knowledge of mortgages, 
suretyships, escrow agreements and other real property subjects” required of 
brokers was “reasonably relevant to [advertisers’] business activity.”96 Unlike 
real estate brokering, real estate advertising was an innocuous vocation 
unrelated to a valid government interest. Because the government’s regulation 
of this ordinary and simple occupation was not supported by a valid government 
interest, the court invalidated the expanded regulation while allowing 
regulation of real estate brokers to continue. 
3.  “Rational, Real and Substantial”: Is the Law Necessary and Tailored, and 
Does the Benefit Outweigh the Burden? 
The protection of the fruits clause is not limited only to ordinary and 
simple occupations. As seen in Tully, North Carolina courts may invalidate 
unreasonable government treatment of occupations at the heart of the police 
power—police officers themselves.97 Government action will survive 
heightened scrutiny only if it has a “rational, real and substantial relation” to 
the government’s objective.98 Again, while this sounds like rational basis review, 
it is not. To have a “rational, real, or substantial relation,” the policy must be 
“reasonably necessary” to achieve that objective.99 Similar to traditional 
heightened scrutiny, a law can fail as “unnecessary” if the objective could be 
achieved without infringing on the fundamental right,100 the policy is 
overinclusive,101 the burden on an individual’s right outweighs the value of the 
 
 94. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. at 11–12, 228 S.E.2d at 496 (citing State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 
S.E.2d 660 (1960)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 12, 228 S.E.2d at 496. 
 97. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 539, 810 S.E.2d 208, 217 (2018). 
 98. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986); 
see also State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949) (explaining the “rational, real, 
or substantial relation” standard for the legitimacy of a state’s statute). 
 99. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 769–70; 51 S.E.2d at 735. 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736 (striking down a regulation where reliance on an 
unregulated free market could more effectively ensure competency and integrity among 
photographers).  
 101. See, e.g., Treants, 83 N.C. App. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 372 (striking down a regulation of 
prostitution because it broadly reached other, legitimate companion services). 
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government’s interest,102 or legal doctrine from “other contexts” suggests the 
government policy or action is unreasonable.103 These principles are best 
understood with reference to precedent. 
First, a law will fail heightened scrutiny if less burdensome alternatives 
could achieve the government’s objective. The Ballance court struck down the 
photography licensing scheme, in part, because the government’s goals could 
have been achieved through the “free competition of free men in a free market” 
without infringing on any individual liberties.104 Again, the Ballance court gave 
no deference to the government’s preference of method.105 
Second, a law will fail if it is overinclusive. In Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Onslow County,106 a state law required licensing for any business “providing or 
selling male or female companionship.”107 While the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals agreed that “[t]he prevention or hindrance of organized prostitution 
. . . is unquestionably a valid objective of local government,” it struck down the 
law as unnecessarily broad.108 The court reasoned that the licensing requirement 
placed an “onerous burden[]” on legitimate businesses uninvolved with 
prostitution.109 Thus, the court held that “[t]he denial or burdening of innocent 
persons’ rights to practice lawful occupations because some other businesses . . . 
are a subterfuge for illegal activity is capricious and irrational.”110 
Third, a law will fail if its burdens outweigh its benefits. In Poor Richard’s, 
Inc. v. Stone,111 the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a regulation on 
military merchants’ property, but only after “balancing the public good likely 
to result from their utilization against the burdens resulting to the businesses 
being regulated.”112 A policy’s reasonableness, the court decided, “becomes a 
question of degree.”113 There, the court decided that (1) the statute was 
sufficiently narrow, since it sought only to regulate “those transactions which 
involve military property” rather than all sales transactions; and (2) the 
government’s objective of ensuring military property is not unlawfully sold 
outweighed the real but limited burdens on the seller because the statute 
 
 102. Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64, 366 S.E.2d 697, 698–99 (1988). 
 103. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018). 
 104. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 771, 51 S.E.2d at 736. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986). 
 107. Id. at 346, 350 S.E.2d at 366 (capitalization omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 108. Id. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 371–72. 
 109. Id. at 355, 350 S.E.2d at 372. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988). 
 112. Id. at 66, 366 S.E.2d at 700 (citing In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 
N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973)). 
 113. Id. 
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employed a “commonly used licensing scheme” that ordinary sellers could 
navigate without much trouble.114 
This list is not exclusive. North Carolina courts may look to other areas of 
state and federal law to determine whether a particular government action or 
policy is unreasonable.115 In Tully, the court cited federal immigration and tax 
law to conclude that an agency’s government action that violates the agency’s 
own policies is unreasonable.116 The central question is whether, in light of all 
circumstances—including the presence of less restrictive alternatives, the 
breadth of the action, the burden on the individual, and other relevant legal 
doctrines—the government’s action was reasonably necessary to further a valid 
interest. 
B. The Fruits Clause Bars Public Employer Action That Is Not “Reasonably 
Necessary” To Achieve a “Valid Governmental Interest” 
As discussed above, the government cannot infringe on the right to pursue 
one’s chosen occupation in the private sector unless the infringement has a 
“rational, real and substantial relation to a valid government interest.”117 In Tully 
and Presnell, the Supreme Court of North Carolina extended that fundamental 
guarantee to those whose “chosen occupation” is in the public sector as well.118 
Thus, while Tully adopted a narrow, fact-specific test, it is clear that the fruits 
clause’s heightened scrutiny “single standard” test described above still restrains 
the government when it acts as an employer as well as when it acts as a regulator. 
To demonstrate a fruits clause violation under this “single standard,” a 
public employee must first show (1) her right to pursue her chosen occupation 
was injured by her employer; and (2) she has no other avenue for relief.119 Then, 
the burden shifts to the employer to (3) identify a “valid governmental 
objective” achieved by the action; and (4) show that the action is “reasonably 
necessary” to achieve that objective.120 If the government’s action is found either 
to be invalid or unnecessary, the court should find for the employee. This four-
part test, rooted in the fruits clause precedent outlined above, ensures that 
government employers are acting within the confines of the state constitution. 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018). 
 116. Id. (first citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); and 
then citing United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811–12 (4th Cir. 1969)). 
 117. See supra Section II.A. 
 118. See Tully, 370 N.C. at 539, 810 S.E.2d at 217; Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 723, 260 S.E.2d 
611, 616 (1979). 
 119. Elements one and two are generally required for any direct claim under the North Carolina 
Constitution. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992) (establishing 
that direct claims can be brought “in the absence of an adequate state remedy” against a government 
actor for violations of rights guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution).  
 120. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369–70 
(1986). 
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1.  Injury to a Public Employee’s Right To “Earn A Livelihood” 
Under step one, a public employee must show that his or her right to 
pursue his or her chosen occupation was injured by a government policy or 
action.121 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has made clear that the fruits 
clause creates a liberty right to work, not a property interest in any particular 
job—ironically, the right to “enjoy the fruits of their own labor” is a 
fundamental right to pursue those fruits but does not create a property right to 
the fruits themselves.122 Instead, to state a claim under the fruits clause, an 
employee must point to a violation of her liberty right to pursue her chosen 
occupation without unreasonable government interference. 
No case has neatly defined a full list of possible fruits clause violations. In 
Tully, the plaintiff did not have a property right to a promotion but did have a 
liberty right to pursue a promotion within the confines of his employer’s stated 
grievance policy.123 In Presnell, the employee lacked a property right to her job 
but maintained a liberty right to pursue similar work elsewhere without the 
burden of defamatory accusations from her previous governmental employer.124 
Additionally, Ballance and its progeny hold that burdensome regulation of an 
occupation may constitute infringement of an individual’s right to pursue that 
occupation.125 
2.  Alternative Avenues for Relief 
Under step two, public employees must show that they have no adequate, 
alternative state law remedy. Direct claims under the North Carolina 
Constitution are available only “in the absence of an adequate state remedy.”126 
This is a “logical limitation”127: direct constitutional remedies are “furnished” 
by courts under state common law, “which provides a remedy for every 
wrong.”128 If an “adequate” remedy is available under a state statute, courts will 
not furnish a constitutional remedy. 
 
 121. See Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 451, 368 S.E.2d 892, 894–95 
(1988) (finding a public employee had not stated a claim for relief because her rights under article I, 
section 1 had not been violated). 
 122. Tully, 370 N.C. at 538, 810 S.E.2d at 217 (“[A] property interest in employment ‘can arise 
from or be created by statute, ordinance, or express or implied contract, the scope of which must be 
determined with reference to state law.’” (quoting Presnell, 298 N.C. at 723, 260 S.E.2d at 616)).  
 123. Id. (“We are aware of no authority recognizing a property interest in a promotion . . . .”). 
 124. Presnell, 298 N.C. at 723, 260 S.E.2d at 616 (“These allegations are insufficient to show a 
Fourteenth Amendment ‘property’ right or vested interest in plaintiff’s continued employment.”) 
 125. See State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949). 
 126. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992). 
 127. Matthew R. Gauthier, Kicking and Screaming: Dragging North Carolina’s Direct Constitutional 
Claims into the Twenty-First Century, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2017). 
 128. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. 
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North Carolina courts have not fully defined what state law remedies are 
adequate.129 Generally speaking, a remedy will be adequate so long as it allows 
the plaintiff to “enter the courthouse doors and present his claim”—in other 
words, the opportunity for victory must be guaranteed to the plaintiff, not 
victory itself.130 Still, a remedy is generally inadequate if it is barred by 
sovereign immunity.131 
Some fruits clause cases may fail step two. For example, a public employee 
who is terminated in violation of her written employment contract, such as a 
tenured public university professor, likely has an adequate remedy under state 
contract law and thus could not bring a claim under the fruits clause. State law 
also bars employment discrimination based on “race, religion, color, national 
origin, age, sex or handicap” by employers of fifteen or more employees.132 Most 
public employees, though, have no written or implied contract with their 
employers and many have claims that do not arise under any state or common 
law principle. These employees may be able to satisfy step two and show they 
have no “adequate remedy.” 
3.  Valid Government Objectives in Regulating Its Own Employees 
At step three, the government bears the burden to show that its action was 
in pursuit of a “valid governmental objective.”133 In many cases, this burden will 
be easily met. Since government jobs are by definition connected to the public 
health, safety, morals, or welfare, even the most ordinary and simple 
government job can be “distinguish[ed]” from those professions protected in 
Ballance and its progeny by the simple fact that each is a public, not private, 
occupation.134 
Still, the government’s power to regulate its employees does not guarantee 
that every action will be in service of a valid governmental objective. A 
government action may fail if, like in Tully, the government presents no “reason 
or rationale” whatsoever for its infringement.135 In addition, a government 
objective may be invalidated by another limit on the police power—racial 
animus, for example, is not a valid government objective.136 Unlike rational basis 
 
 129. For a full analysis of the contours of direct claims under the North Carolina Constitution, see 
Gauthier, supra note 127, at 1736–38. 
 130. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 333–34, 340, 678 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2009). 
 131. Corum, 330 N.C. at 785–86, 413 S.E.2d at 291–92. 
 132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2019). 
 133. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 352, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (1986); 
see Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64–65, 366 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1988).  
 134. See Stone, 322 N.C. at 65, 366 S.E.2d at 699. 
 135. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018). 
 136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (barring racial discrimination of employees generally); Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating a ban on interracial marriage because “[t]here is patently 
no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies” such a 
ban); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I cannot conceive of 
98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020) 
2020] RIGHT TO BE TREATED REASONABLY AT WORK 1591 
review, where courts presume “the existence of facts supporting the legislative 
judgment,”137 the government must prove under heightened scrutiny that its 
actions were actually taken in pursuit of a legally valid objective. 
4.  “Reasonably Necessary” Employer Policies and Actions 
Under step four, the government bears the burden to show that its action 
is “reasonably necessary” to accomplish its valid objective. While a court may 
look to a wide range of factors in determining whether a particular government 
action was reasonably necessary, seven factors from the fruits clause precedent 
analyzed above appear particularly relevant to the public employer-employee 
context. 
To determine whether a government employer’s action or policy was 
“reasonably necessary,” a court should consider: (1) the degree to which the job 
is “ordinary and simple;” (2) the degree to which the regulation is tailored to 
the interest; (3) the significance of the government’s interest; (4) the 
significance of the burden on the employee; (5) the degree to which the policy 
is consistent with other government policies; (6) the degree to which the policy 
is reasonable in light of similar policies in other contexts; and (7) how judicial 
intervention would impact constitutional structure and the separation of 
powers. 
Factor one reflects precedential significance of job complexity. Jobs that 
include great responsibility for public finances, health, or welfare or are 
vulnerable to illicit behavior warrant more stringent regulation, while more 
ordinary and simple jobs warrant less burdensome restrictions. Details of the 
job are particularly important—recall the difference in Aikens between real 
estate brokers and real estate advertisers.138 For example, while passage of a 
thorough background check may be a reasonably necessary prerequisite to 
ensure a public school custodian does not pose a threat to school children, such 
a restriction may be less reasonably necessary for a custodian in a public building 
that has no children. 
Factor two reflects precedential hostility to regulations that are overbroad 
and interests that can be achieved through less restrictive means. As in Ballance, 
each court must determine the actual causal relationship between the action and 
the intended result and inquire whether other, less restrictive actions could 
achieve the same result.139 And, as in Aikens, an action reasonably necessary to 
regulate one occupation—like real estate brokers—may still violate the fruits 
 
a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person’s skin the test . . . .”); Enoch v. Inman, 
164 N.C. App. 415, 415–16, 596 S.E.2d 361, 362 (2004) (holding state employees may sue for race 
discrimination under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 137. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 138. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
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clause if it reaches another occupation—like real estate advertisers—for which 
the action is unnecessary.140 
Factors three and four reflect the Stone balancing test and hostility toward 
regulations whose burdens outweigh its benefits.141 Like in Stone, each court 
ought to factor individual “burdens” against the “public good likely to result” 
from the government action.142 Narrowly tailored, “commonly used” burdens 
on employees may be justified by significant government benefits.143 Again, the 
court should assess a regulation’s tailoring, benefits, and burdens on the merits 
rather than defer to the government’s assessment.144 
Factors five and six reflect Tully’s reasoning: allowing courts to look to 
outside reference points to assess reasonableness.145 As held in Tully, a public 
employer’s action that violates its own policies is presumptively 
unreasonable.146 Under factor five, a burdensome policy or action is less 
reasonable if other North Carolina agencies or political subdivisions achieve the 
same objectives through less burdensome policies. Factor six allows courts to 
look to employment policies in other jurisdictions and the private sector and to 
legal doctrines in other areas of law to measure whether an employer’s action is 
reasonably necessary. For example, a county’s use of employee surveillance 
technology147 designed to reduce employee theft may be less reasonable if other 
North Carolina counties, or similar counties across the United States, or even 
substantially similar private employers, maintain lower theft rates without 
utilizing invasive technology. Certainly, each job, county, department, and state 
has its own idiosyncrasies, and public employers should have the flexibility to 
pursue new solutions to local problems. Factors five and six simply allow courts 
to inform their reasonableness determinations by looking to outside 
standards.148 
 
 140. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text. 
 142. Poor Richards, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 66, 366 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1988). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (2018) (looking to 
federal immigration and tax administrative law to determine whether an agency action is unreasonable 
when it violates its own policies); supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.  
 146. Tully, 370 N.C. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 215; see supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 147. Employee surveillance technology is becoming more popular, particularly among private 
technology companies. See Ellen Sheng, Employee Privacy in the US Is at Stake as Corporate Surveillance 
Technology Monitors Workers’ Every Move, CNBC (July 22, 2019, 6:42 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/15/employee-privacy-is-at-stake-as-surveillance-tech-monitors-
workers.html [https://perma.cc/GTH7-P29B]. 
 148. Outside “standards of care” are widely used to show unreasonableness in North Carolina 
employment law. White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 166 N.C. App. 283, 302, 603 S.E.2d 147, 160 (2004) 
(“Plaintiff offered sufficient expert testimony regarding the standard of care in the insurance industry 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [defendant] breached its duty to plaintiff.”). 
Outside “standards of care” are also common to show unreasonableness in other areas of North Carolina 
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Finally, I add one concern that has not been mentioned in any fruits clause 
case prior but should be considered in future cases concerning public employees. 
Like the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Constitution vests each 
branch of government with “separate and distinct powers.149 Factor seven asks 
courts to recognize that any claim asking for judicial relief for an employee of 
the executive or legislative branches necessarily calls into question this 
separation of powers. Public political jobs intimately involved in the 
effectuation of powers enumerated to other branches, such as a governor’s chief 
of staff or a legislator’s political advisor, may warrant different regulation than 
nonpolitical jobs. Still, North Carolina courts have not shied away from 
prohibiting or compelling action from other branches when fundamental rights 
are concerned.150 Courts are obliged to protect even political employees from 
unreasonable government treatment. 
III.  EXAMPLES: CREATIVE USE OF THE FRUITS CLAUSE 
Two concrete examples—overworked school counselors and social 
workers, and legislative staffers facing sexual harassment—help to explain how 
the promise of the fruits clause can be leveraged to improve the lives of North 
Carolina’s public employees. 
A. Overworked School Counselors and Social Workers 
In addition to teachers, administrators, and other support staff, North 
Carolina’s public schools employ school counselors and social workers to 
“promote student success, provide preventive services, and respond to 
 
law, such as products liability and medical negligence. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 
124 N.C. App. 59, 64–65, 476 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1996) (“The essential elements of a products liability 
action predicated upon negligence are: ‘(1) evidence of a standard of care owed by the reasonably 
prudent person in similar circumstances; (2) breach of that standard of care; (3) injury caused directly 
or proximately by the breach, and; (4) loss because of the injury.’” (quoting Ziglar v. E. I. Du Pont de 
Neumers & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 150, 280 S.E.2d 510, 513 (1981))), aff’d as modified, 346 N.C. 767, 
488 S.E.2d 240 (1997); see also Robinson v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 229 N.C. App. 215, 233, 747 
S.E.2d 321, 334 (2013) (“In order to maintain an action for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must offer 
evidence to establish (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) breach of that standard; (3) proximate 
causation; and (4) damages.”). 
 149. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State 
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The executive 
power of the State shall be vested in the Governor.”); id. art. IV, § 1 (“The judicial power of the State 
shall . . . be vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997) (holding that the 
North Carolina legislature cannot deny students the right to “equal access” to public education without 
showing the denial was “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409, 412, 378 
S.E.2d 780, 782 (1989))).  
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identified student needs.”151 School counselors monitor and treat their students’ 
mental health through school-wide programming and one-on-one counseling.152 
School social workers “provide the vital link between the home, school, and 
community”153 by “connecting students and their families to critical community 
services such as food stamps, healthcare services and childcare alternatives.”154 
School shootings, natural disasters, and rising teen suicide rates have 
placed outsized pressure on counselors and social workers, who often serve as 
the only mental health professionals in their students’ lives.155 The vast majority 
of today’s students—72%—experience some significant stressor, such as 
violence, abuse, or the loss of a loved one, before the age of eighteen.156 Suicides 
among children ages ten to seventeen increased by 70% in the decade between 
2006 and 2016.157 To effectively serve every student’s needs, the American 
School Counselor Association (“ASCA”) and the National Association of Social 
Workers (“NASW”) recommend employing one counselor and one social 
worker for every 250 students.158 A lower ratio of one counselor and social 
worker per fifty students is recommended when the social worker or counselor 
is providing services to students with intensive needs, like suicidal tendencies, 
addiction, or trauma.159 
American schools lag behind the ASCA- and NASW-recommended 
ratios. Nationally, public schools employ on average one counselor for every 
 
 151. REBECCA GARLAND, SCHOOL COUNSELOR JOB DESCRIPTION 6 (2008), 
https://files.nc.gov/dpi/documents/studentsupport/counseling/standards/counselordesc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RY36-HJES]. 
 152. Id. at 6–7. 
 153. School Social Worker, N.C. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://www.dpi.nc.gov/
educators/specialized-instructional-support/school-social-worker [https://perma.cc/ZP29-YBNE]. 
 154. What Is the Difference Between a School Counselor and a Social Worker?, ABA DEGREE 
PROGRAM GUIDE, https://www.abadegreeprograms.net/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-a-school-
counselor-and-a-social-worker/ [https://perma.cc/UF9B-SNG4]. 
 155. Bethany Bray, One School Counselor per 455 Students: Nationwide Average Improves, 
COUNSELING TODAY (May 10, 2019), https://ct.counseling.org/2019/05/one-school-counselor-per-
455-students-nationwide-average-improves/ [https://perma.cc/34KL-RWB3]; Mattie Quinn, After 
Shootings and Hurricanes, Where Are the School Counselors?, GOVERNING: FUTURE STS. & LOCALITIES 
(Apr. 9, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-school-counselors-trauma-
shooting-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/A9JE-HQKD]. 
 156. AMIR WHITAKER ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COPS AND NO COUNSELORS: 
HOW THE LACK OF SCHOOL MENTAL HEALTH STAFF IS HARMING STUDENTS 4, 
https://www.aclu.org/report/cops-and-no-counselors [https://perma.cc/GX24-PP5Q]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. NASW Highlights the Growing Need for School Social Workers To Prevent School Violence, NAT’L 
ASS’N SOC. WORKERS (Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter NASW News Release], 
https://www.socialworkers.org/News/News-Releases/ID/1633/NASW-Highlights-the-Growing-
Need-for-School-Social-Workers-to-Prevent-School-Violence [https://perma.cc/PE3L-XTD2]; 
Student-to-School-Counselor Ratio 2015–2016, AM. SCH. COUNS. ASS’N, 
https://www.schoolcounselor.org/asca/media/asca/home/Ratios15-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRU4-
FMGY]. 
 159. NASW News Release, supra note 158. 
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455 students—nearly double the recommended ratio.160 Social workers fare even 
worse. As of 2016, American schools averaged one social worker for every 2000 
students, and “[m]ore than 67,000 schools reported zero social workers serving 
their students.”161 These higher ratios result in negative outcomes for both 
children and support staff: due to the highly emotionally taxing nature of their 
work, “overworked and under-resourced”162 counselors and social workers are 
particularly vulnerable to burnout.163 
North Carolina similarly lags behind the recommended ratios. Symone 
Kiddoo, a Durham County social worker, reported being solely responsible for 
1125 students—a ratio nearly five times the NASW recommendation.164 She is 
not alone. On average, the state employs one counselor for every 367 students 
and one social worker for every 2000.165 These high ratios are just the average. 
Though data for each school counselor and social worker’s workload is not 
publicly available, it is not hard to imagine a counselor or social worker whose 
ratio is significantly higher than the average, with 3000 to 4000 students under 
their individual care (as opposed to the recommended 500). 
By using the test outlined above, a court could find these individual, 
extreme ratios between school counselors or social workers and their students 
to be a violation of the fruits clause. To demonstrate the four-part test outlined 
above, let’s imagine a hypothetical plaintiff who works as a school counselor and 
is individually responsible for 500 students. 
1.  Step One: Interference 
At step one, an employee must show that an outsized number of students 
interferes with her right to pursue her chosen occupation. Our plaintiff has 
chosen to work as a counselor in a public school. Her large student load infringes 
on her ability to pursue her career in two ways: first, high counselor-to-student 
ratios pose an emotional roadblock to counselors. In addition to the ordinary 
 
 160. T. Keung Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough? Berger and NCAE Hotly Debate Issue 
Ahead of May 1 March, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Apr. 29, 2019, 4:17 PM) [hereinafter Hui, How 
Many School Counselors Is Enough?], https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/
article229802244.html [https://perma.cc/6V62-853D (dark archive)].  
 161. WHITAKER ET AL., supra note 156, at 12. 
 162. Alanna Fuschillo, The Troubling Student-to-Counselor Ratio that Doesn’t Add Up, EDUC. WK. 
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/08/14/the-troubling-student-to-counselor-
ratio-that-doesnt-add.html?cmp=eml-enl-eu-news1&M=58578827&U=1001093 
[https://perma.cc/GY2R-SUFV]. 
 163. Rhonda Williams, The Importance of Self-Care, ASCA: SCHOOLCOUNSELOR (Jan. 1, 2011), 
https://www.schoolcounselor.org/magazine/blogs/january-february-2011/the-importance-of-self-care 
[https://perma.cc/RT6D-FE2X] (“Researchers have identified that the range of school counselors who 
have high levels of emotional exhaustion and burnout is between 30 percent and 66 percent.”). 
 164. Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160. 
 165. Greg Childress, On School Psychologists, North Carolina Doesn’t Measure Up, PROGRESSIVE 
PULSE (Jan. 18, 2019), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2019/01/18/north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/
62DR-NFNK]. 
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fatigue of being overworked, counseling is a uniquely draining profession that 
leaves professionals emotionally exhausted.166 A counselor with double the 
number of recommended students may be unable to persist in her chosen 
profession, getting burned out early in her career.167 
Second, high counselor-student ratios reduce a counselor’s ability to do 
her job effectively. Counselors are simultaneously responsible for improving 
their school’s mental health environment and providing direct therapy to high-
need students.168 A counselor responsible for 500 students likely has twice as 
many high-need students but the same amount of time, causing her to spend 
less time with each student or fail to meet with a student entirely. Further, 
counselors are often additionally responsible for scheduling, testing, and other 
administrative work, which also increases with their student load.169 
Consequently, counselors with high ratios may have less total time to spend with 
a greater number of high need students. This restriction on efficacy could be 
viewed by a court as a burdensome regulation of her chosen profession since the 
government’s decision to burden her with extra students has hindered her 
ability to pursue the fruits of her labor: improved children’s mental health. 
The state in our hypothetical case could contend that, since mental health 
professionals exist in the private sector, this burden does not interfere with our 
plaintiff’s ability to pursue her chosen occupation outside the school system. 
More on point, private schools also employ counselors to conduct highly similar 
work. Still, public school counselors have different responsibilities than private 
sector counselors,170 often working county or statewide to improve mental 
health outcomes.171 Public school counselors have greater access to a wide range 
of students, since minority students in particular “are more likely to follow 
through with school-based services due to the barriers to accessing community 
mental health services.”172 Further, the mental and emotional strain placed on 
counselors working with an outsized number of students could cause burnout, 
making them unwilling or unable to continue working as a counselor, even in 
 
 166. Williams, supra note 163 (“[C]ounseling is a form of one-way giving.”). 
 167. See id. 
 168. GARLAND, supra note 151, at 7. 
 169. See Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.  
 170. For example, public school counselors often help students with career or college plans. 
Typically, private school counselors do not. School Counselor 101, EDUCATOR’S ALLY (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://educatorsally.com/school-counselor-101/ [https://perma.cc/BG4Y-RJUM]. 
 171. See N.C. SCH. COUNSELOR ASS’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: 2013-2014 THROUGH 2018-2019, at 
4–5, https://www.ncschoolcounselor.org/page-1535570 [https://perma.cc/6JT8-6LVR] (describing the 
professional development objectives for school counselors and the desired results including an 
“[i]ncrease in requests for NCSCA representation in statewide activities and events.”). 
 172. Carol J. Kaffenberger & Judith O’Rorke-Trigani, Addressing Student Mental Health Needs by 
Providing Direct and Indirect Services and Building Alliances in the Community, 16 PROF. SCH. 
COUNSELING 323, 325 (2013). 
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the private sector.173 Like in Presnell, this reduction in a school counselor’s 
ability to find work in the private sector could constitute an interference with 
her state constitutional rights.174 
2.  Step Two: Adequate Alternatives 
In step two, the employee must show that she has no adequate alternatives 
to remedy her grievance. For our hypothetical plaintiff, this is likely easy to 
prove. School counselors are typically at-will employees and, if they have multi-
year employment contracts, which are rare, the contract likely does not 
guarantee any counselor-student ratio.175 Further, North Carolina public 
employees are barred from collective bargaining, a typical method used to 
address burdensome work conditions in other states.176 
The state could argue that, because school funding and hiring is a political 
determination, school counselors should turn to the political process to push 
school districts to reduce counselor-student ratios. This argument would likely 
fall flat, though. In many of the fruits clause cases outlined above, plaintiffs 
could have petitioned the legislature to repeal the unconstitutional regulation.177 
Never has a North Carolina court recognized political lobbying as an adequate 
alternative in fruits clause cases. 
3.  Step Three: Valid Governmental Objective 
At step three, the government bears the burden of showing that its action 
was in furtherance of a valid governmental objective. Here, the government’s 
primary objective is budgetary. The legislature and school districts must balance 
the cost of hiring more counselors with other budgetary priorities, such as hiring 
more teachers and increasing employee pay while keeping taxes competitive 
with other nearby states.178 Certainly, the state’s budget priorities are valid 
 
 173. See Williams, supra note 163. 
 174. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 175. School districts are allowed to sign school employees to multi-year contracts, but few do. See 
T. Keung Hui, It’s Not Tenure, but NC Teachers Will Get More Job Security, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh 
Dec. 20, 2017, 1:03 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/article190767074.html 
[https://perma.cc/WYQ2-JSE9 (dark archive)]. 
 176. Dawn Baumgartner Vaughn, Freshmen State Legislators Want To Overturn Law that Has Held 
Back Unions for 60 Years, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Apr. 24, 2019, 7:20 PM), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article229597039.html [https://perma.cc/2YPR-2FBG 
(dark archive)]. 
 177. See, e.g., State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 768–72, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734–36 (1949) (striking down 
a commercially restrictive statute on constitutional grounds alone and never mentioning a requirement 
that a plaintiff petition the legislature first before commencing litigation). 
 178. The North Carolina General Assembly’s 2019 budget proposal included some raises for state 
employees and teachers, hired more school psychologists, increased the state’s “rainy day fund,” and 
preserved a corporate tax cut but fell short of providing the $688 million necessary to meet nationally 
recommended ratios for school counselors, social workers, nurses, psychologists, and resource officers 
statewide. See Dan Way, N.C. General Assembly Releases Budget Plan; Prepares for Battle with Governor, 
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governmental interests. Still, because providing each student with a “sound 
basic education” is also a constitutionally prescribed, valid governmental 
objective,179 the state may struggle to show that its decision to burden our 
hypothetical plaintiff with 500 students was reasonably necessary to achieve its 
budgetary priorities. 
4.  Step Four: Reasonably Necessary 
At step four, the government must show that its interference with 
plaintiff’s constitutional right was reasonably necessary to achieve the interests 
established in step three. As discussed above, a court should look to seven 
factors to determine whether the state’s interference was reasonably necessary. 
Factor one (job complexity) weighs in favor of both our plaintiff and the 
state. School counseling is a complex job—North Carolina school counselors are 
required to have a master’s degree and have a direct impact on the mental health 
of North Carolina children.180 Typically, the judiciary should defer to the state’s 
experienced judgment on how to regulate these complicated professions. In this 
case, though, the state likely cannot claim that an extreme 1:500 counselor-
student ratio is a beneficial regulation on the school counseling profession. High 
ratios have demonstrably negative impacts on student mental health outcomes, 
college admissions, and overall student success.181 Thus, job complexity in this 
case may suggest counselors need more one-on-one time with students and, thus, 
lower ratios. 
Factor two (tailoring) weighs strongly in favor of the plaintiff. While 
increased funding would help reduce counselor ratios across the state, the 
General Assembly could eliminate extreme counselor-student ratios without 
providing increased funding. In July 2017, the legislature required all school 
districts to reduce average class sizes for kindergarten through third-grade 
classes from twenty-two to seventeen students without providing additional 
funding.182 While the plan was politically unpopular and eventually 
 
CAROLINA J. (June 25, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/n-c-general-
assembly-releases-budget-plan-prepares-for-battle-with-governor/ [https://perma.cc/9PN4-YS6T]; 
Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160.  
 179. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1997); see N.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 7. 
 180. North Carolina school counselors are required to have a master’s degree. School Counseling, 
N.C. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://www.dpi.nc.gov/educators/specialized-instructional-
support/school-counseling [https://perma.cc/L8R2-EQA5]. 
 181. James Murphy, The Undervaluing of School Counselors, ATLANTIC (Sep. 16, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/09/the-neglected-link-in-the-high-school-to-
college-pipeline/500213/ [https://perma.cc/TQ6B-ASGU (dark archive)]. 
 182. See, e.g., T. Keung Hui & Lynn Bonner, North Carolina Schools Get Reprieve on K-3 Class-Size 
Rules, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Feb. 8, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/
news/local/education/article199108964.html [https://perma.cc/MN6G-J35U (dark archive)] (detailing 
the delay of a class-size reduction law that was imposed without additional funding). 
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abandoned,183 the legislature could conceivably employ a similar strategy to 
require school districts to rein in extreme counselor-student ratios without 
sacrificing their valid budgetary objectives. The presence of a budget-neutral 
alternative to extreme ratios, even a politically unpopular one, undermines the 
state’s argument that high ratios are reasonably necessary to achieve it budget 
priorities.  
Factors three (government interest) and four (employee burden) likely 
weigh in favor of the plaintiff as well. While the government does have an 
interest in reducing spending, that interest is likely small compared to the 
significant burden a 1:500 counselor-student ratio places on the employee. 
Reducing ratios for school counselors, social workers, nurses, psychologists, and 
resource officers statewide to recommended levels would cost $688 million;184 
however, it would cost significantly less to eliminate extreme examples where a 
counselor has a number of students that far exceeds the statewide average. This 
reduced cost would likely pose a small burden on the state: in 2018, North 
Carolina had a $357 million surplus and spent over $100 million of the $23 
billion budget on earmarks, or “no-strings-attached cash to faith-based and 
other charities” and local governments.185 In contrast, our hypothetical plaintiff 
is effectively working two jobs, responsible for twice as many students, crises, 
programs, meetings, forms and filings as is recommended for her profession. In 
the absence of additional facts, the burden on our plaintiff far outweighs the 
financial burden on the state to remedy her extreme workload. 
Factors five (state comparisons) and six (national comparisons) weigh in 
favor of both parties. On one hand, at 500 students, our plaintiff treats 133 
students more than North Carolina’s average counselor at 1:367. Since average 
counselor-student ratios fluctuate county by county,186 the plaintiff can likely 
point to counties in North Carolina where no counselors are responsible for 500 
students. National comparisons also favor the plaintiff: the plaintiff’s load is 
higher than the national recommended ratio and actual average.187 On the other 
hand, only two states have managed to reach the recommended counselor-
student ratio, and North Carolina’s average ratio is lower than most states’ 
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 184. Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160. 
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(Raleigh June 1, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article212376184.html 
[https://perma.cc/9YJV-HTYM (dark archive)]. 
 186. Wake County, home of North Carolina’s state capital, Raleigh, has an average 1:447 
counselor-student ratio. Michael Perchick, Wake County Public Schools Budget Calls for More School 
Support Staff, ABC11 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://abc11.com/3329095/ [https://perma.cc/M38V-VKHB]. 
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DRKH]. 
 187. Hui, How Many School Counselors Is Enough?, supra note 160. 
98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020) 
1600 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
averages or the nation’s as a whole.188 The government could argue that 
reducing the student-to-counselor ratio further is unrealistic given these 
comparisons. Still, the issue here is not the experience of the average school 
counselor but a single school counselor who is responsible for twice the 
recommended ratio. Because this counselor’s workload is significantly higher 
than the state or federal averages, comparisons to other school systems could 
benefit the plaintiff. 
Finally, factor seven (separation of powers) favors the state. Hiring 
additional counselors implicates the budgeting power at either the state or local 
level, a power explicitly reserved to the legislative and executive branches.189 
Traditionally, courts are reluctant to instruct political bodies on how to allocate 
funds. Still, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has required greater 
education funding to guarantee fundamental rights in the past, and a recent 
judicial order will require the state to significantly increase school funding in 
future budgets.190 While a court should hesitate before interfering with the 
state’s budgetary power, doing so is appropriate where, as here, budget decisions 
have interfered with a public employee’s constitutional rights. Because the 
factors weigh in favor of our plaintiff when balanced, a court in this hypothetical 
case should find that the government’s interference with the plaintiff’s right to 
pursue her chosen occupation as a public school counselor was not reasonably 
necessary to pursue valid budgetary interests, and thus violated the state 
constitution. 
B. Sexual Harassment Reporting for Legislative Staff 
A similar analysis can be conducted for the General Assembly’s sexual 
harassment reporting policy for legislative staff. Under North Carolina Human 
Resources policy, “[a]ll [North Carolina public] employees have the right to 
work in an environment free from discrimination and harassing conduct.”191 
Generally, state employees who suffer harassment may bypass their immediate 
supervisor and file a report through an independent process192—any employee, 
that is, except staffers at the General Assembly. Currently, legislative staff, 
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 191. N.C. OFFICE OF STATE HUMAN RES., STATE HUMAN RESOURCES MANUAL: UNLAWFUL 
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT § 1, at 15 (Apr. 2019), https://files.nc.gov/ncoshr/documents/
files/Unlawful_Workplace_Harassment_Policy_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3P7-3NK2]. 
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interns, and pages who experience harassment may report to either their 
supervisor, the Speaker of the House or the Senate Pro Tempore, or the 
Legislative Ethics Committee.193 None of these options are confidential, and 
despite numerous failures by the Legislative Ethics Committee to investigate 
alleged harassment,194 these reporting policies have not been updated since 
2010.195 
In 2018, news broke that Representative Duane Hall had engaged in 
“persistent sexual innuendo” and “repeated, unwanted sexual overtures,” 
including kissing two women without their consent.196 One woman who applied 
to work as his Legislative Assistant in 2016 was told that he could not hire her 
unless she “gained 100 pounds” because she was “too pretty.”197 Five other 
sources detailed harassment that predated the 2016 encounter but requested 
anonymity in the press “for fear of repercussions in their current jobs” as 
legislative staffers.198 Still, no formal complaints were filed against Rep. Hall.199 
The legislature’s “unlawful workplace harassment policy” would have required 
victims of harassment to report Representative Hall, a Democrat, to either 
Speaker of the House Tim Moore, a Republican, or to Representative Hall’s 
colleagues in the Legislative Ethics Committee.200 Neither reporting avenue 
would have allowed the confidentiality sought by the five sources who reported 
the harassment to the press.201 
Like in the example above, this reporting policy may violate the rights of 
legislative employees under the fruits clause. First, employees could likely show 
that the reporting policy places a barrier on their ability to pursue their chosen 
occupation. The General Assembly is a unique work environment for those 
hoping to participate in researching, shaping, and helping citizens navigate 
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public policy.202 Sexism and harassment create a complete barrier to this work 
for some individuals—at least one woman was denied employment based on her 
appearance—and “are associated with negative outcomes such as decreased job 
satisfaction, lower organizational commitment, withdrawing from work, ill 
physical and mental health, and even symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.”203 Victims are less likely to report harassment due to fear of 
retaliation, especially when reporting avenues are not confidential.204 When 
reports are suppressed, harassers avoid liability and are able to continue their 
behavior without repercussion. Thus, nonconfidential reporting policies like the 
one here could decrease reporting and enable harassment. 
Second, depending on specific circumstances, a plaintiff-employee injured 
by the reporting policy may not have adequate alternatives under state law. 
Though North Carolina and federal employment law prohibit sexual 
harassment,205 employees may not be able to win relief against a state legislator. 
Legislators acting in their official capacities enjoy “absolute immunity” in 
certain circumstances.206 When legislators have acted outside their official 
capacities, the state may not be vicariously liable for their actions.207 And the 
fruits clause may prohibit more sexual harassment than state or federal law—a 
question that has not been considered by any court. 
Third, if a hypothetical plaintiff could meet her burden in steps one and 
two, the state could likely meet its burden in step three. The state’s 
nonconfidential reporting process balances the state’s valid objective of 
reducing sexual harassment with its goal of ensuring that the accused can 
confront accusers. Further, by allowing legislators to internally regulate their 
colleagues’ behavior, the policy ensures that legislators are not beholden to 
unelected investigators. 
 
 202. See, e.g., Legal Analyst I (Local Government Law Staff Attorney), N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://careers.ncleg.net/PostingDetails/1081 [https://perma.cc/QM47-SPMD] (“The nonpartisan 
staff of the Legislative Analysis Division provide legal analysis, policy research, general information, 
and legislative drafting services for all 170 Legislators of the North Carolina General Assembly.”). 
 203. Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and 
Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127, 127 (2007). 
 204. Expectation of retaliation and nonconfidentiality are leading reasons employees do not file 
sexual harassment claims. See Carly McCann, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & M.V. Lee Badgett, 
Employer’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, U. MASS. AMHERST: CTR. FOR EMP. EQUITY (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.umass.edu/employmentequity/employers-responses-sexual-harassment 
[https://perma.cc/5K9V-XJZX]. 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2(a) (2019). 
 206. TREY ALLEN, IMMUNITY OF THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM LAWSUITS 
IN NORTH CAROLINA 8 (2013) (first citing Scott v. Granville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983); 
and then citing Vereen v. Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 468 S.E.2d 471 (1996)). 
 207. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS 
(June 18, 1999), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/S5QT-8UVE]. 
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At step four, though, a court could find that the policy is not reasonably 
necessary. Factor one weighs in favor of the government: legislative jobs are 
often partisan and may demand advanced legal training. Factor two weighs in 
favor of the employee: the policy is not well tailored since the Legislative Ethics 
Committee may dispose of complaints before accused legislators can confront 
accusers at a formal hearing,208 and legislators may be criminally investigated in 
other contexts by unelected third parties.209 These facts show that the 
government’s interest is relatively small (factor three), because its objectives are 
not truly affected under its current plan, while employees’ interests (factor four) 
are high in reducing sexual harassment and avoiding retaliation for reporting 
harassment. Factors five and six strongly weigh in favor of the plaintiff because 
(as discussed) the legislature’s policy is in conflict with the general state 
reporting policy. Finally, factor seven weighs in favor of the government, 
because a court interference with the legislative branch’s regulation of its own 
employees directly implicates the separation of powers. Still, factors one and 
seven are outweighed by the other five. A court could find this reporting policy 
to be a constitutional violation. 
CONCLUSION 
In Tully v. City of Wilmington, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
extended a long recognized fundamental right to “pursue [one’s] chosen 
profession” free from unreasonable government interference as applying to 
public sector employees.210 While the court’s holding was limited to the facts of 
that case, its reasoning gives public employees a new avenue to seek relief when 
they are unreasonably burdened by their employers. 
The Tully court’s reasoning is not limited to North Carolina. While a 
guarantee to “the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor”211 is unique to the 
North Carolina Constitution, twenty-six states have similar protections, 
including a right to “the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry,”212 “to 
be rewarded for industry,”213 and to the “means of acquiring . . . property.”214 
 
 208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-103.1(c)–(h2) (2019). 
 209. Id. § 120-103.1(b)(2)c.; see Dan Kane, Prosecutor Asks SBI To Review Allegations Raised About 
House Speaker Moore, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Oct. 8, 2018, 11:11 AM), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article219586045.html [https://perma.cc/4KGN-7ZEV 
(dark archive)]. 
 210. Tully v. City of Wilmington, 370 N.C. 527, 536, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215–16 (2018). 
 211. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 212. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Westlaw through Nov. 2018 amendments); see also ALASKA 
CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through 2019 First Reg. Sess. and 2019 First Spec. Sess. of the 31st Leg.) 
(stating “the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry”).  
 213. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw through 2018 legislation). 
 214. VA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 
(Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2020 Reg. 
Sess.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting property”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Westlaw through 
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Like in North Carolina, these provisions have been similarly interpreted as 
protections against unreasonable regulation.215 While the exact reasoning used 
by the Tully court will not make sense in every state, other states may be 
receptive to arguments rooting protections for public employees in their 
constitutions. 
Though public jobs remain desirable for their relative stability and 
guaranteed benefits,216 budget cuts,217 increased demands,218 and political 
 
amendments adopted through the Nov. 5, 2019 election) (same); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw 
through 2018 legislation) (“to acquire, possess and protect property”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1 
(Westlaw through effective legislation through Chapter 95 of the 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of the 65th 
Idaho Leg.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting property”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw 
through Nov. 8, 2016 General Election) (same); ME. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Chapter 
586 of the 2019 Second Reg. Sess. of the 129th Leg.) (same); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (Westlaw 
through amendments approved Feb. 1, 2020) (same); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Westlaw through 
2019 Sess.) (same); N.H. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw through Chapter 7 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.) 
(same); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through amendments approved at Nov. 5, 2019 election) 
(same); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 (Westlaw through amendments approved at the general election held 
Nov. 6, 2018) (same); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through the end of the 80th Reg. Sess. 2019) 
(same); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through File 29 of 133rd General Assemb. 2019–2020) 
(same); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Chapter 1 of the 2020 Gen. Sess.) (“to acquire, 
possess and protect property”); VT. CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through acts 1–85, and 99 of the 
Adjourned Sess. of the 2019–2020 Vermont General Assemb.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property”). Other states use a similar formulation. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Westlaw through end 
of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“acquiring and protecting property”); KY. CONST. § 1 (Westlaw through 
emergency effective legislation through Chapter 5 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.) (same); S.D. CONST. art. 
VI, § 1 (Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Laws) (same). Some states have even broader phrasing. See ARK. 
CONST. art. II, § 2 (Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 92d Arkansas General 
Assemb.) (“acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation”); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 
(Westlaw through amendments approved at the general election held Nov. 8, 2018) (same); PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 1 (Westlaw through Nov. 5, 2019 General Election) (same). But see also LA. CONST. 
art. I, § 4 (Westlaw through amendments through Jan. 1, 2020) (“Every person has the right to acquire, 
own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable 
statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.”).  
 215. See, e.g., Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 452–53 (Alaska 1963) (striking down a commercial-
fisherman licensing scheme on state constitutional grounds); Grondin v. Town of Hinsdale, 451 A.2d 
1299, 1301 (N.H. 1982) (“[The state constitution places] limitations upon the so-called police power 
. . . and nullif[ies] arbitrary legislation passed under the guise of that power.”); Cryan v. State, 583 
P.2d 1122, 1124 (Okla. 1978) (“To sustain encroachment on an individual’s liberty, there should be an 
obvious and real connection between the regulation and its purpose to protect the public welfare and 
that this purpose can be served in no less restrictive means.”). 
 216. Carole Moore, Government Jobs Offer Good Pay Benefits, BANKRATE (May 5, 2008), 
https://www.bankrate.com/finance/jobs-careers/government-jobs-offer-good-pay-benefits.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/RXX5-YSBN]. 
 217. See, e.g., Michael Leachman, Timeline: 5 Years of Kansas’ Tax-Cut Disaster, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 24, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/timeline-5-years-of-kansas-tax-cut-
disaster [https://perma.cc/3UMD-DJVC] (describing the impact of severe budget cuts on Kansas’s 
public employees). 
 218. See, e.g., Why Class Size Matters Today, NAT’L COUNCIL TCHRS. ENG. (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www2.ncte.org/statement/why-class-size-matters/ [https://perma.cc/7UT2-UUYB] (“Today 
public schools employ 250,000 fewer people than before the recession of 2008–09, while enrollment 
has increased by 800,000, and class sizes in many schools are at record highs.”). 
98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1575 (2020) 
2020] RIGHT TO BE TREATED REASONABLY AT WORK 1605 
gamesmanship219 have depressed morale across the country and made 
recruitment and retention of public employees even more challenging.220 In 
addition to political and legislative action, public employees who suffer 
unreasonable treatment at the hands of their employers ought to have a remedy 
in court. Creative lawyers and judges should answer Justice Brennan’s call and 
use these often-overlooked state constitutional provisions to protect public 
servants from unreasonable, unlawful employer abuse. 
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